We provide a three way theoretical comparison of dealer, limit order, and hybrid markets and analyze the impact that the organization of trading has on volume, liquidity, and price efficiency. We find, in particular, that trading volume is highest in the limit order market and lowest in the dealer market. Small order price impacts are lowest and large order price impacts are highest in limit order markets. Prices are most efficient in the hybrid market and least efficient in the dealer market, except when the level of informed trading is very high. Post-trade market transparency in a hybrid market hampers price efficiency for thinly traded securities. We further identify that traders behave as contrarians. * Intra-day financial market trading is organized using two major mechanisms: order driven and quote driven trading. Order driven markets typically employ a public limit order book. In quote driven markets, all trades are arranged by designated institutions that post quotes. The latter markets are commonly referred to as dealer markets. Many real world markets are hybrids, combining both organizational forms.
Intra-day financial market trading is organized using two major mechanisms: order driven and quote driven trading. Order driven markets typically employ a public limit order book. In quote driven markets, all trades are arranged by designated institutions that post quotes. The latter markets are commonly referred to as dealer markets. Many real world markets are hybrids, combining both organizational forms.
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The coexistence of competitive limit order and dealer markets and the differences in their trading outcomes have long been challenged by academic research. Madhavan (1992) shows that, with competitive liquidity provision, a quote driven system and a uniform price order driven system lead to identical outcomes. Glosten (1994) and Back and Baruch (2007) argue that a quote driven system that competes with a discriminatory limit order book in an anonymous market would mimic the limit order book.
Our paper builds on this line of research but serves a different purpose. We posit non-anonymity, in the sense that repeat or split order submissions are identified, and thus effectively take the coexistence of the mechanisms as given. Our goal is to describe the relative advantages and disadvantages of the three trading systems: a discriminatory limit order book, a dealer market, and a hybrid market.
Our major contribution is twofold. First, we provide an integrated theoretical framework that admits a three-way comparison. The differences in trading outcomes of the three trading mechanisms in our setting highlight, in particular, the significance of the discriminatory order book and post-trade market transparency. Second, we employ our framework to derive novel empirical predictions for the impact of the organization of trading on volume, liquidity, and price efficiency. In comparing competitive markets, we complement the literature on markets where liquidity providers have market power (e.g., Seppi (1997) ), which we discuss below.
Limit order and dealer markets differ in many aspects. One defining feature of the systems is the level of market transparency enjoyed by the liquidity providers. Limit orders are posted prior to the liquidity demand realization, whereas dealers' quotes account for the order size. We show that this difference in the liquidity providers information both yields new empirical predictions and explains a large share of the previously noted heterogeneity among the trading outcomes.
The liquidity providers in the dealer market are able to determine the information content of a transaction most accurately. The high level of transparency on the side of liquidity suppliers, however, lowers liquidity demanders' rents and causes them to trade less aggressively. The efficiency gain that stems from the dealers' informational advantage is thus muted by the lowest trading volume. We find that the liquidity demand reduction effect dominates, so that the lack of trading activity renders the dealer market to be least informationally efficient, except when the level of informed trading is very high. The hybrid market combines the limit order market's aggressive order submission with the dealer market's superior screening ability and yields the most efficient prices. We thus reject the commonly argued hypothesis that the presence of the upstairs dealer who absorbs a large fraction of uninformed order flow ("skims the cream") necessarily hurts the main (limit order book) exchange participants. Our model has the following structure. Liquidity demanders trade either for reasons outside the model (e.g., to rebalance their portfolio), or they have private information about the security's fundamental value and optimally choose the size and direction of their trade (or abstain from trading). Liquidity is supplied by competitive, uninformed, and risk-neutral institutions, as in standard market microstructure models in the tradition of Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) .
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In the dealer-market, the liquidity providers observe the order flow and then compete for it in a Bertrand fashion. The equilibrium price aggregates the information contained in the order flow. In the limit order market, liquidity providers post a schedule of buy and sell limit orders, each for the purchase or sale of a specific number of units. We assume a "discriminating" order book design, as in Glosten (1994) , and the prices incorporate the information revealed when the respective limit order is "hit" by a market order of the same or larger size. The bid-and ask-prices in this setting are the "lower-tail" and "upper-tail" conditional expectations of the security value. One additional contribution of our paper is thus in formulating a model that tractably integrates both a limit order book and a dealer market in a multi-unit Glosten and Milgrom sequential trading setup.
Our setup builds on Easley and O'Hara (1987) who study a dealer market where an imperfectly informed trader, equipped with a signal of either high or low quality, submits a large or a small order and usually chooses a mixed strategy.
3 Our methodological innovation is that we employ private signals of a continuum of qualities. We are then able to focus on pure strategies and concisely characterize the equilibrium by the marginal buyers and sellers. These marginal traders, and hence a trader's choice of the order size, are endogenous to the market organization. This endogeneity and the fact that traders with more precise information prefer to submit larger orders are the key to our results. Liquidity providers in dealer markets know the order size and are thus intrinsically better at pin-pointing the information content of a trade. As a result, when markets are operated in isolation, small trades receive better execution prices in the dealer market (that is, the bid-ask spread is smaller)
4 and large trades are cheaper in the limit order book. In a hybrid market, both informed and noise traders are allowed to choose the segment to trade in. Consequently, when all order sizes are traded in both market segments, trading costs for each order size must coincide across the two mechanisms. We show that to equalize the equilibrium trading costs, the dealer segment of a hybrid market must absorb most large trades, whereas the limit order segment will absorb most small trades. The total number of transactions in the limit order segment is larger than that in the dealer market segment.
Further, large orders in the dealer market segment will have lower information content.
The results on the information content of trades are closely related to Seppi (1990) and Grossman (1992) . Seppi studies the behavior of a single, possibly informed, large institution and finds, in particular, that repeated interactions among the exchange participants lead to routing of the uninformed trades to the off-exchange dealers. In Seppi, both the on exchange specialists and the off exchange dealers set prices according to a Kyle (1985) style dealer market pricing rule. Grossman studies the relation of upstairs and downstairs markets, both of which employ uniform pricing rules. In his model some traders may leave a non-binding indication to trade with the upstairs dealers, which increases the effective liquidity in the upstairs segment. We complement this line of research by studying traders' self-selection into dealer and limit order segments, where the latter employs a discriminatory pricing rule.
Our analysis further shows that the behavior of traders in the dealer and hybrid markets is not stationary. For instance, as prices drop, unfavorably informed traders submit sell-orders less aggressively and favorably informed traders submit buy orders more aggressively, thus acting as contrarians. This result is supported by recent empirical findings (see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) ) and we thus contribute to the literature by providing theoretical underpinnings for rational contrarian behavior.
In the second part of our paper, we compare market widths, price impacts, price efficiency, and trading volume in the three trading mechanisms: pure dealer markets, pure limit order books, and hybrid markets. In addition to the aforementioned results on efficiency and execution costs, we find that trading volume is the highest in the limit order market and the lowest in the dealer market. Finally, price impacts of small orders are stronger in dealer markets and those of large orders are stronger in limit order markets.
Our results on the price impacts of small trades may seem surprising at first: despite the smaller spreads, price impacts are larger in the dealer markets. To understand this, recall that small order prices in the limit order book account for the fact that the order might be large. Consequently, when a small order executes in a limit order book, the transaction price overshoots. Market participants will correct their expectations of the security once they know the order size, and the permanent price impact of the transaction will be smaller.
In the hybrid market this correction only occurs if there is post trade transparency in that market participants observe the segment that the order cleared in. The final result of our paper describes how a lack of post-trade transparency affects price efficiency. We find that noisier learning in an opaque market reduces market efficiency in frequently traded stocks. Interestingly, when trading activity is low, the effect of noisier learning is outweighed by that of larger price adjustments, and the opaque market is more efficient.
Other aspects of transparency have been studied in the literature. Pagano and Roell (1996) compare transparency of a uniform price auction with a dealer market system. Brown and Zhang (1997) combine a Kyle (1985) -style and a rational expectations style setup to study dealers' decisions to participate in a market, and to describe how dealers' decisions to supply liquidity affect the informational efficiency of prices. Boulatov and George (2008) analyze the effects of transparency in a uniform price market with informed and strategic liquidity provision.
Finally, market structures have also been compared in the literature that studies the strategic provision of liquidity.
5 Seppi (1997) studies a hybrid market, in which a monopolistic specialist competes with a pure limit order book, as is the case on the NYSE. He finds, in particular, that small orders receive better executions in the hybrid market whereas medium orders receive better executions in the pure limit order market. Parlour and Seppi (2003) extend Seppi (1997) by studying competition between these two exchanges. Buti (2007) builds on Seppi (1997) and adds relationship trading and pricequantity based screening by the specialist. We complement these studies by analyzing hybrid markets where competitive dealers compete with the limit order book, as is the case on many major equity markets.
6
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the model. Section II derives the equilibria for the three trading mechanisms. Section III develops testable predictions for the hybrid market. Section IV compares the three mechanisms with respect to execution costs, volume, and price efficiency. Section V analyzes the impact of post-trade transparency in the hybrid market. Section VI discusses the results and possible policy implications. Appendix A derives properties of traders' information structures, Appendix B outlines the simulation procedures, and Appendix C contains all proofs. Most figures and tables are at the end of the manuscript, in particular, Tables III and IV , which summarize our findings and existent empirical support for our predictions.
I The Basic Setup

A General Market Organization
We consider a stylized model of security trading, in which informed and uninformed traders trade a single security by submitting market orders. At each discrete point in time there is exactly one trader who arrives at the market according to some random process. These individuals trade upon their arrival and only then. Short positions are filled at the true fundamental value.
Liquidity is supplied by uninformed, risk-neutral institutions that compete for order flow and earn zero expected profits. In the limit order market, the liquidity providers post a series of limit buy-and sell-orders. The former constitutes a series of ask-prices, the latter a series of bid-prices. Each price is for a single unit (i.e. a round lot). Traders post market orders after observing these prices.
7 In the dealer market, the trader posts his market order first and the liquidity providing dealers then compete in a Bertrand fashion for this order.
8
In a hybrid market, both systems coexist.
B Model Details
Security: There is a single risky security with a liquidation value V from a set of two potential values, V ∈ {0, 1}, with Pr(V = 1) = 1 / 2 . Traders: There is an infinitely large pool of traders out of which one is drawn at each point in time at random. Each trader is equipped with private information with probability µ > 0; if not informed, a trader becomes a noise trader (probability 1 − µ). The informed traders are risk neutral and rational.
Noise traders have no information and trade randomly. These traders are not necessarily irrational, but they trade for reasons outside of this model, for example to obtain cash by 7 When referring to a liquidity provider in singular, we will use the female form and for liquidity demanders we will use the male form.
8 At the end of Section II we will formally argue that our model can accommodate public dealer quotes.
liquidating a position. 9 To simplify the exposition, we assume that noise traders make trades of either direction and size with equal probability. Trade Size: All trades are market orders for round lots. The order at time t is denoted by o t where o t < 0 indicates a sell-order and o t > 0 is a buy-order. Traders can submit a large order, |o t | = 2, a small order, |o t | = 1, or abstain from trading, o t = 0.
C Information
Public Information: The structure of the model and the prior distribution of fundamentals is common knowledge among all market participants. The identity of a trader and his signal are private information. The public information H t at date t > 1 is the sequence of orders o t and realized transaction prices at all dates prior to t: H t = ((o 1 , p 1 ) , . . . , (o t−1 , p t−1 )). H 1 refers to the initial history before trades occur.
Liquidity Providers' Information: In the dealer market, the liquidity providers know the public history H t and the order o t . In the limit order market, liquidity providers do not know which order will be posted at time t, and their information is only H t .
Informed Traders' Information: We follow the sequential trading literature in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) (henceforth: GM) and assume that traders receive a binary signal about the true liquidation value V . These signals are private, and they are independently distributed, conditional on the value V . Specifically, informed trader i is told "with chance q i , the liquidation value is High/Low (h/l)" where
This q i is the signal quality. In contrast to most of the GM literature, we assume that these signals come in a continuum of qualities and that q i is trader i's private information. The distribution of qualities is independent of the security's true value and can be understood as reflecting, for instance, the distribution of traders' talents to analyze securities. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of noise and informed traders and the information structure.
In what follows, we will combine the binary signal (h or l) and its quality on [ 1 / 2 , 1] in a single variable on [0,1], namely, the trader's private belief that the security's liquidation value is high (V = 1). This belief is the trader's posterior on V = 1 after he learns his quality and sees his private signal but before he observes the public history. A trader's distribution: first, it is determined whether a trader is informed (probability µ) or noise (probability 1 − µ). If informed, the trader obtains a signal quality. Next, he receives the "correct" signal (h when V = 1 and l when V = 0) with probability q i and the "wrong" signal with probability 1 − q i . (The draw of V is identical for all agents.) If the trader is noise, he will be a large and small buyer and seller with equal probabilities.
behavior given his private signal and its quality can then be equivalently described in terms of the trader's private belief. This approach allows us to characterize the equilibria in terms of a continuous scalar variable (as opposed to a vector) and thus simplifies the exposition.
The private belief is obtained by Bayes Rule and coincides with the signal quality if the signal is h,
In what follows, we will denote the density of private beliefs by f 1 (π) when the fundamental is V = 1 and by f 0 (π) when V = 0. Appendix A fleshes out how these densities are obtained from the underlying distribution of qualities and it provides a numerical example.
II Dealer, Limit Order and Hybrid Markets
In what follows, we will focus on the buy side of the market; analogous results apply to the sell side. We will use L for the limit order market, D for the dealer market, and H for the hybrid market. When discussing findings for the hybrid market, we write HL for the limit order segment and HD for the dealer market segment. The Trader's Decision. An informed trader receives his private signal, observes all past trades, and can trade upon arrival and only then. In the limit order market, he observes the posted prices, in the dealer market, he forms expectations about the price that he would be quoted, conditional on each order size. The trader chooses the order size to maximize his expected profits or abstains from trading if he expects to make negative trading profits.
Denote the total execution cost of a size o t order by C t (o t ). To compress notation, we write the expectation of a trader with belief π after history H t as E[V |H t , π] =: E t π. Then the payoff to submitting a buy order of size o t for this trader is
A trader's expectation is increasing in the private belief. We thus focus on monotone decision rules, i.e. the higher the trader's belief is, the more he wants to buy. Specifically, we assume that traders use a "threshold" rule: they buy two units if their private belief π is at or above the time-t buy threshold π 2 t , π ≥ π 2 t , they buy one unit if their belief is at or above π
, and they do not buy otherwise. To simplify the exposition, we will henceforth omit subscript t.
The marginal buyer of two units, π 2 , is indifferent between buying one and two units.
The marginal buyer of one unit, π 1 , is indifferent between buying one unit and abstaining.
Consequently, π 1 and π 2 solve respectively
Price Setting: Limit Order Book. The liquidity providers anticipate the traders' behavior given the marginal buyers π 1 L , π 2 L . The limit orders account for the information content of the market orders that they would be executed against. The limit order prices are the ask prices. The price ask 1 L is the price for the first unit sold by liquidity providers, and it accounts for the fact that this unit is purchased by demanders of order size o ≥ 1. The price ask 2 L is the price for the second unit, and it accounts for the fact that the trade size is o = 2. As liquidity providers earn zero expected profits, it must hold that
Price Setting: Dealer Market. Since the liquidity demanders submit their orders before prices are posted, the information available to a dealer includes the size of the order. This implies that traders pay a uniform price for each unit that they buy.
11 Although traders do not know the price of their transaction before posting a market order, given the marginal buyers π 1 D , π 2 D , they can perfectly anticipate the quote. In light of this, we will henceforth refer to prices for buy orders as ask-prices. Then
Finding the Equilibrium. In the limit order market, we have
Then the marginal buyers' indifference conditions (1) can then be rewritten as
In the dealer market, we have
2 D , and conditions (1) can be rewritten as
In the limit order market, the first unit is bought by traders who demand one or two units.
In the dealer market, the single unit is purchased only by traders who demand just one unit. Let β o v,m denote the probability that there is a buy of o ∈ {1, 2} units when the value of the security is v ∈ {0, 1} in market m ∈ {L, D},
The probability that a given trader is informed is independent of other traders' identities and the security's liquidation value. As private beliefs are independent conditional on the security's value, so are traders' actions. Suppressing indices L and D, the ask prices for unit o ∈ {1, 2} and the expectation of the marginal trader π o can be written explicitly as
Hybrid Markets. Most real world equity markets operate with a hybrid structure where traders have the choice of either arranging their trade with a dealer or posting it to the limit order book.
12 We now consider a trader's choice of order size and trading venue.
is Ozsoylev and Takayama (2008) . 12 For instance, on the Toronto Stock Exchange traders can approach an upstairs dealer or they can send their order directly to the consolidated limit order book. Some systems are more complex: for instance, on NYSE, a market order that arrives at the specialist's desk could be filled with the current book, with the specialist or with floor brokers who opt to participate, or the specialist can auction the order to
In the isolated markets, the equilibrium description contained, loosely, information about who traded how many units. In hybrid markets, the equilibrium description must additionally include information about where someone trades. We restrict traders to route their orders either to the limit order or the dealer segment but not to both. An alternative specification would allow traders to split large orders between market segments by routing a small order to each segment. Our analytical results are robust to including this option, as we explain at the end of this section. Yet, our focus is on the competition between different trading mechanisms, and we thus simplify the exposition by excluding the splitting of orders. We maintain that noise traders are non-strategic with respect to their order size but allow them to optimally choose the trading venue for their order.
We focus on the arguably most common scenario where all order sizes are traded in each segment.
13 Then the execution costs for orders of the same size must coincide across the two market segments because otherwise traders would switch to the cheaper segment. Put differently, in equilibrium traders must self-select into market segments in such a way that trading costs coincide. This cost equalization implies that noise and informed traders who trade a specific size will be indifferent between trading it in either segment. Moreover, the marginal informed traders coincide in both market segments. Let λ o m denote the mass of noise traders that submit buy orders of size o ∈ {1, 2} to market segment m ∈ {HL, HD} and let ξ o m denote the probability that an informed trader submits a buy order of size o ∈ {1, 2} to market segment m ∈ {HL, HD}. We maintain the assumption that liquidity traders demand each quantity with equal probability, thus λ 
Ask prices and traders' expectations are expressed in the same way as in (4). Cost equalization across segments and the indifference between order sizes yield the following four floorbrokers. On Nasdaq, small orders are routed to dealers according to a set of rules. We abstract from these institutional subtleties, and focus on the main distinction between the two general systems. 13 There are exchanges that exogenously limit the trading of specific quantities in certain market segments. For instance, on the Australian Stock Exchange (see Fong, Madhavan, and Swan (2003) and ASX (2008)), only trades with value above one million Australian dollars can be cleared with an upstairs dealer. Our model allows to study such a situation, and the results in subsequent sections will extend. We omit the discussion of markets with size specialization to save space. equilibrium conditions on trading costs
Costs C HL (1), C HD (1) are the ask-prices, C HD (2) = 2 · ask 2 HD , and C HL (2) = ask
HL . These costs are determined by the information content of the underlying order and thus, loosely, the equilibrium restricts only the proportion of informed to noise traders. There are essentially two ways to study the self-selection of traders into market segments that is implied by the equilibrium proportions. One can study the behavior of informed traders for an exogenously fixed distribution of noise traders across market segments, or the reverse.
14 Importantly, when both order sizes are traded in both market segments, all traders (informed and noise) of a particular order size must be indifferent between the two segments. When the noise distribution is exogenous, however, the informativeness of prices is limited and thus so is the range of values that costs can attain (such a restriction is not imposed when fixing ξ 1 , ξ 2 ) . and study the implied self-selection of noise traders. Formally, we find the equilibrium by determining (a) the marginal buyers who are indifferent between trading one and two units (π Order Splitting. Suppose traders are allowed to split large orders across market segments by submitting one unit order to the limit order book and another unit order to the dealer. 15 Since trading in our model is non-anonymous, the dealer will learn whether an order is split. 16 An example for such a market is an exchange where all trades, even those that go to the limit order book, are submitted through a dealer (such as the TSX). Two scenarios are possible. In the first, noise traders do not split orders. Then any split order would be identified as informed, and in equilibrium the dealer would quote price 1 for a buy order and 0 for a sell-order. 17 An informed trader would then never split an order and our analysis remains unaffected. In the second scenario, both noise traders and informed traders split large orders. Let ξ 2 S denote the probability that an informed trader splits an order (ξ so that the equations in (5) are satisfied, and additionally, that the cost of a split order is the same as that of submitting a block order of two units. Without a formal analysis, one can obtain several insights. First, with cost equalization the same marginal trader makes a two unit block trade and splits the order. Second, since a split order costs the same as the two unit block order in the limit order segment, the price for the unit that is send to the dealer must be the same as the price of the second unit in the limit order segment. In this sense, when observing a split order, the dealer "mimics" the limit order book. These two observations imply that λ Our analytical results in the subsequent sections are robust to allowing this extra layer of complexity. To simplify the exposition and to highlight the competition between the different trading systems, we present the results only for the case without order splitting.
Public Dealer Market Quotes. Our treatment of price formation in the dealer market is stylized: people submit their market orders without knowing the price and there are no standing quotes from dealers. In real markets dealers do publicly quote bid and offer prices. Moreover, in many markets, dealers are required to trade a guaranteed minimum number of units at these quotes (for instance, for most stocks a Nasdaq dealer's quote "must be 15 Back and Baruch (2007) study a different kind of order splitting in which traders split a block trade by submitting a series of small orders. They find that this type of order splitting does not provide better execution than a block trade in the limit order segment, but order splitting yields a better execution in the anonymous dealer segment.
16 In contrast, in Glosten (1994) dealers are unable to identify split orders. 17 Any other set of prices would generate a "lemons" problem.
good" for 1,000 shares). On some exchanges, e.g. the TSX, the upstairs dealers are required to trade at the best bid or offer (BBO) that are currently on the book, unless the size of the trade is very large. Exchanges that use small-order routing systems (i.e. small orders are given to dealers according to a pre-determined set of rules) require dealers to "improve prices" to at least match the BBO. These institutional details are compatible with our setup. First, in the equilibrium of our model traders can perfectly anticipate the price that they will be quoted if they approach a dealer. Second, our model can be rewritten to accommodate (a) public quotes in the dealer market and (b) minimum fill sizes for these quotes. In this rewritten version of the model, the quoted ask price would be ask 2 D , the price for a large order. When facing a small order, the dealer would then improve the price to ask 1 D . This alternative setup would also satisfy the BBO rule for hybrid markets. We chose our current formulation to simplify the exposition.
III Testable Predictions for the Hybrid Market
The hybrid market equilibrium is determined by the marginal traders and by the fractions of noise traders in each market segment, which in turn affect the informativeness of trades.
Suppose a small trade arrives in the dealer market segment. Then the dealer knows that the trade stems from an informed trader with belief π ∈ [π 1 H , π 2 H ) or from a noise trader. The first unit in the limit order segment, on the other hand, is hit by orders from informed traders with beliefs π ∈ [π 1 H , 1]. Ceteris paribus, this should make the single unit trade in the limit order segment more informative and thus more expensive. To have equal costs, intuitively, there must be more noise in the limit order segment. The reverse applies to large orders. The following result confirms this intuition.
Proposition 1 (Trade Informativeness in the Hybrid Market Equilibrium)
The ratio of noise to informed traders of small size orders is larger in the limit order segment, and the ratio of noise to informed traders of large orders is larger in the dealer segment.
Proposition 1 provides a theoretical basis for the empirical finding that upstairs markets -which loosely correspond to the dealer market segment-are better at identifying uninformed trades. Our result shows that the co-existence of the two major trading mechanisms necessarily implies that more uninformed traders seek to trade large quantities with dealers.
The information content of trades implied by Proposition 1 is similar to that in Seppi (1990) , where a large, possibly informed trader has the choice between trading anonymously on the exchange or non-anonymously off the exchange. If he chooses the latter option, he may be punished, due to repeated interactions, for "bagging the street". This threat drives traders' self selection. Notably, the pricing mechanisms on and off the exchange in Seppi (1990) follow a Kyle (1985) -style dealer market pricing rule. We thus complement Seppi (1990) by studying traders' self-selection into dealer and limit order segments.
When the mass of informed traders in either market segment is the same, Proposition 1 implies that there are more small noise trades in the limit order segment and more large noise trades in the dealer segment. We can further show that in this case there are in total more noise traders that trade either quantity in the limit order segment.
Proposition 2 (Transactions by Market
(a) There are more large transactions in the dealer segment than in the limit order segment; the reverse holds for small transactions. (b) The limit order segment attracts more transactions than the dealer segment.
IV Comparison of the Three Trading Mechanisms
We will now analyze how the different market mechanisms affect spreads, execution costs, and volume and how efficient the systems are relative to each other. Our goal is to generate testable predictions for these major observable variables.
A Spreads, Market Width, and Price Impacts.
We will first compare the trading mechanisms with respect to market liquidity, namely market width and price impacts.
Market width (sometimes also referred to as market breadth) is the cost of doing a trade of a given size. It is the dual of market depth, which measures the size of a trade that can be arranged at a given cost.
18 For small trades, the width is associated with the bid-ask-spread. When people trade for informational reasons, a larger width indicates higher adverse selection costs and thus a lower willingness to provide liquidity. We measure width for order size o by the dollar cost of a buy transaction, C(o).
The price impact reflects how the market assesses the information content of a trade. If the current transaction price and the public expectation coincide, then the price impact is the difference between the current and the past transaction price. If they differ, then the price impact reflects the permanent effect of a trade on prices.
19 We quantify the price impact by ∆p
Proposition 3 (Liquidity Measures) (a) Market width for small trades is ordered as follows:
Market width for large trades is ordered as follows:
Price impacts of large trades are ordered as follows ∆p
The intuition underlying these results is that liquidity providers in dealer markets are intrinsically better at pin-pointing the information content of a transaction because they know the order size before setting the price. While this lowers traders' information rents, those with lower quality information are better off being identified, as is demonstrated by the lower spreads in the dealer market. For in the limit order market, very well informed traders hide among the less well informed ones and thus earn a rent at their expense.
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In GM models with single unit trades, the price impact is the change in the transaction price. In our model, this remains true in the dealer market and the dealer segment of the hybrid market. In the limit order market and the limit order segment of the hybrid market, however, the public expectation of the security value coincides with the transaction price only after large orders, but not after small orders.
To understand this point, observe that in limit order markets, the ask price for the single unit trade accounts for the fact that all informed traders with belief π ∈ [π 1 , 1] buy this unit. Yet after it is revealed that an arriving trader bought only one unit, it is known that this trade was performed by an informed trader with belief π ∈ [π 1 , π 2 ] (or by a noise trader). As a consequence, the price impact of small orders in the limit order segment is intuitively smaller than that implied by the transaction price. Hence the displayed order of price impacts. Finally, numerical simulations reveal that ∆p 1 HL and ∆p 1 L cannot be ordered.
B Dynamic Behavior
In the limit order market, the history of trades does not affect a trader's decision to buy or sell. In the dealer market and hybrid market, the behavior is history dependent.
Proposition 4 (Behavioral Dynamics and Contrarianism) As p changes from 0 to 1, (a) trading behavior does not change in the limit order market, (b) all trading thresholds increase in the dealer market, and (c) all trading thresholds increase in the hybrid market.
between the effective spread and the realized spread, where the effective spread is the transaction price at time t minus the midpoint of the bid-ask-spread at t and the realized spread is the transaction price at t minus the midpoint of the bid-ask-spread x minutes later at t + x (see, for instance, Bessembinder (2003)). 20 The result that small trades are cheaper on dealer markets has been previously noted by, for instance, Glosten (1994) or Seppi (1997) .
Part (a) is implied by expressions (2) and (4). In the dealer and hybrid markets, however, the marginal types change with the prior p. If the prior favours a trader's opinion, two effects occur. First, the trader feels more encouraged by the public opinion. Second, the marginal value of his information declines. Traders "herd" when the first effect dominates so that they need lower quality signals to trade. Traders "act as contrarians" when the second effects dominates so that they need higher quality signals. Proposition 4 shows the latter for the dealer and hybrid markets, in line with empirical observations (see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) ).
C Volume
The results in the remainder of this section are based on simulations of the trading process for the case of a uniformly distributed quality (see the example in Appendix A) with a symmetric split of informed traders, ξ 1 = ξ 2 = 1 / 2 . Although our model describes single trader arrivals for each period, we can proxy volume in market m ∈ {L, D, H} at prior p = Pr(V = 1) by the expected number of units that will be traded upon the arrival of a trader,
We compute vol numerically on a fine grid for the feasible parameters (the prior p and the amount of informed trading µ) and find the following.
Numerical Observation 1 (Volume) For any prior p and any level of informed trading µ, volume is ordered as follows:
Figure 3 illustrates this numerical observation. The intuition for the finding stems from the behavior of the traders who submit large orders. In the dealer market, large order traders are identified, whereas in the limit order market they hide among the small order traders. As a consequence, the marginal buyer of the large quantity has the highest belief in the dealer market and the lowest belief in the limit order market (we show this formally in the proof of the existence theorem). Traders thus submit large orders least aggressively in the dealer market and most aggressively in the limit order market, which leads to the lowest and highest volumes respectively.
D Price Efficiency
Price efficiency measures the closeness of a price to the fundamental value of a security. We analyze it in two ways. First, we compute the expected price impact for each trading mechanism. Second, we simulate sequences of trades that mimic the arrival of traders during a specific trading day. The final price after a sequence can be interpreted as the closing price. We then base our analysis of price efficiency on the properties of the expected price impacts and of the closing prices.
We perform our analysis of closeness for the fundamental value V = 1. 21 Then the higher the public expectation, the closer it is to the true value. Thus higher price impacts and closing prices are associated with a more efficient market mechanism. We measure the price impact by the change in the public expectation. We thus compute numerically for all priors p ∈ (0, 1), levels of informed trading µ ∈ (0, 1) and market mechanisms m ∈ {L, D, H}, using
To simplify the exposition, we use E∆p m for the expected price impact. We obtain the simulated closing prices as follows. For each level of informed trading µ ∈ {.1, . . . , .9} we simulated 500,000 trading days with entry rates ρ ∈ {10, . . . , 50}. For each day, we generated random realizations for the number of traders (a Poisson arrival; parameter ρ) and their entry order, traders' identities (noise vs. informed; parameter µ), trading decisions for noise traders, and beliefs for informed traders (fixing the fundamental value to V = 1). The public expectation that obtains after these traders have acted is the closing price for that day.
22 The signal quality distribution is assumed to be uniform.
We assess closeness of closing prices to the fundamental value in two ways. First, we compare the average closing prices. Second, we compare the empirical distributions of closing prices to see if one mechanism systematically yields higher and thus more efficient prices. "Systematically higher" in a distributional sense obtains if the empirical distributions of prices can be ranked in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. By definition, distribution F x first order stochastically dominates distribution F y if F x (p) ≤ F y (p) for all closing prices p. We will thus compare the differences of empirical distributions.
To ensure that the distribution of closing prices is reasonably smooth, we focus on the 21 To measure closeness to the true fundamental, we need to fix this value. The analysis for the case of V = 0 is symmetric.
22 As we discussed after Proposition 3 this public expectation may differ from the last transaction price. To simplify the exposition, we will refer to the last value of the public expectation as a "closing price". case ρ = 50 when analyzing properties of the empirical distributions of prices.
23 Further parametric and procedural details of the simulation process are outlined in Appendix B. We write F m ,p m , and σ m for the empirical distribution, average, and standard deviation of closing prices in market m ∈ {L, D, H}.
In presenting our results we are loose in listing them for "low", "middle" and "high" µ. These regions of µ differ slightly for different ρ.
24 Table I displays the signs of the differences in averages and illustrates the observation; Figure 5 plots the differences of expected price impacts. Note that an ordering in the sense of first order stochastic dominance implies the same ordering for the average prices; we report both measures for completeness.
Numerical Observation 2 (Price Efficiency)
The results on expected price impacts and price distributions are consistent: the hybrid market dominates the limit order market, which dominates the dealer market, except when µ is very large. We do not have conclusive results concerning the price distributions for low levels of µ, where prices are driven largely by noise. An efficiency measure based on the average price alone could be criticized if higher average prices go along with higher price volatility. Indeed, this is what we observe for low µ where σ H > σ L > σ D . For medium and high levels of µ, however, this criticism does not apply. The first order stochastic dominance ordering implies the same ordering in the sense of second order stochastic dominance, and thus more efficient prices are also less dispersed.
Numerical Observation 2 argues, in particular, that the hybrid market is more efficient than the pure limit order market. The dealer segment thus serves an important role in enhancing market efficiency. To see the intuition for this, observe, first, that in the hybrid market most noise traders of large size orders submit them in the dealer market segment (Proposition 1). Second, relative to informed traders, noise traders are more likely to trade in the "wrong" direction. Finally, the price impact of a large order in the pure limit order book is smaller than that in the limit order segment and larger than that in the dealer market segment (Proposition 3). In other words, the limit order segment of the hybrid market attracts most of the "right" direction large trades and these have the highest price impact; the converse obtains for the dealer market segment. Together these effects imply the relation between hybrid and limit order markets.
V Transparency vs. Opacity in the Hybrid Market
Transparency is usually separated into pre-trade and post-trade transparency. The former reflects the information that trading parties possess before they either demand or supply liquidity, the latter reflects their information about past transactions.
Our model assumes that liquidity demanders have full pre-trade transparency, i.e. they can either see all available quotes (for the limit order book) or they can infer the prices that they will be quoted in equilibrium (for the dealer market). Liquidity suppliers face higher pre-trade transparency in the dealer market than in the limit order market, because they know the order size for which they supply liquidity.
Post-trade transparency obtains in the limit order market because anyone can observe when and how far an order "walks the book". We also assume full post-trade transparency for the dealer market in that all transactions are disclosed.
Our analysis of the hybrid market thus far has assumed the same level of post-trade transparency. In particular, we have assumed that after every transaction all market participants learn the size of a trade and the segment it cleared in. We will now investigate the impact of the information about the trading venue. In what follows we refer to the market where the venue is revealed as the transparent market and we refer to the market where the venue is not revealed as the opaque market.
In the opaque market, the price impact of any small trade is driven purely by the transaction price. In the transparent market, on the other hand, small trades in the limit order segment have smaller price impacts than those implied by the transaction prices. We analyze the effect of these different price impacts on price efficiency, using the measures described in the last section. Table II and Figure 6 illustrate the following results.
Numerical Observation 3 (Transparency vs. Opacity)
(a) For a large enough entry rate ρ, the transparent market is more efficient in the sense that average closing prices there are higher and thus more efficient; for small entry rates it is the reverse. (b) Prices in the transparent market are less volatile than those in the opaque market in the sense of the second order stochastic dominance.
The expected price impacts, or changes in the public expectation, as defined in (6), are not ordered, but the displayed patterns (see Figure 7) are consistent with the above findings and provide an intuition for them. Recall that, fixing the fundamental to V = 1, larger price impacts are associated with higher efficiency. We observe that for low and medium levels of the prior p, the expected price impact in the opaque market is larger than that in the transparent market; the reverse holds for high levels of p. This switch explains why the opaque market is more efficient for low entry rates ρ (or, "thinly" traded stocks). For small numbers of trades (low ρ), the public expectation moves little so that the prior p remains close to 1 / 2 where the opaque markets yields stronger movements of prices in the direction of the fundamental. Since on average, traders are more likely to be "right" than "wrong", when there are many trades (high entry rate ρ), the public expectation will be close to the fundamental, 1, most of the time. In this region, the transparent market yields larger price impacts and thus higher price efficiency.
The larger dispersion in the opaque market is explained by the fact that small trades there move prices more strongly in either direction.
VI Conclusion
This paper provides a three way theoretical comparison of dealer, limit order and hybrid markets. We analyze the impact of these trading mechanisms on price efficiency, volume, liquidity, and trade execution costs and generate several new empirical predictions.
The organization of trading, the regulations and the rules can differ dramatically among different exchanges. Yet almost all trading arrangements can be classified as one of the three mechanisms that this paper studies. Our model provides the benchmark differences that these mechanisms would display empirically, controlling for other institutional details.
In addition to generating empirical predictions, our paper has implications for empirical methodology. First, we identify that trading behavior in hybrid and dealer markets changes throughout the trading day. Estimations that use aggregate numbers of trades, as is common practice when estimating the probability of informed trading, must thus account for this possibility. Second, our results indicate that the price impacts of small trades in limit order markets are smaller than the changes in transaction prices. The difference between these two measures reflects the information conveyed by the total order size. Attributing this difference to inventory risk would overestimate such costs.
Finally, our findings have policy implications for professional market design. Historically, many equity markets have developed from pure dealer markets to hybrid markets where a dealer segment coexists with a limit order book. Our analysis highlights the advantages of such developments, such as increased price efficiency and trading volume.
We further argue that a hybrid market has advantages over a pure limit order market in that prices are more efficient and costs for small orders are lower. The efficiency gain stems from the stronger price impact of large trades in the limit order segment of the hybrid market and requires sufficient volume in the limit order book. If traders exogenously gravitate towards the dealer segment so that there are only few transactions in the limit order segment, then the informational advantage of the hybrid market is lost. Thus market designers and regulators may find it beneficial to guarantee that a sufficient order flow reaches the limit order book. Indeed, some exchanges, e.g. the Toronto Stock Exchange, require small orders to be routed to the limit order book.
A Appendix: Quality and Belief Distributions
Financial market microstructure models with binary signals and states typically employ a constant common signal quality q ∈ [ 1 / 2 , 1], with Pr(signal = h|V = 1) = Pr(signal = l|V = 0) = q. This parameterization is easy to interpret, as a trader who receives a high signal h will update his prior in favor of the high liquidation value, V = 1, and a trader who receives a low signal l will update his prior in favor of V = 0. We thus use the conventional description of traders' information, with qualities q ∈ [ 1 / 2 , 1], in the main text. As discussed in the main text, to facilitate the analysis, we map a vector of a trader's signal and its quality into a scalar continuous variable on [0, 1], namely, the trader's private belief. To derive the distributions of traders' private beliefs, it is mathematically convenient to normalize the signal quality so that its domain coincides with that of the private belief. We will denote the distribution function of this normalized quality on [0, 1] by G and its density by g, whereas the distribution and density functions of original qualities on [ 1 / 2 , 1] will be denoted byG andg respectively.
The normalization proceeds as follows. Without loss of generality, we employ the density function g that is symmetric around 1 / 2 . For q ∈ [0, 1 / 2 ], we then have g(q) =g(1 − q)/2 and for q ∈ [ 1 / 2 , 1], we have g(q) =g(q)/2. Under this specification, signal qualities q and 1−q are equally useful for the individual: if someone receives signal h and has quality 1 / 4 , then this signal has "the opposite meaning", i.e. it has the same meaning as receiving signal l with quality 3 / 4 . Signal qualities are assumed to be independent across agents and independent of the fundamental value V .
Beliefs are derived by Bayes Rule, given signals and signal qualities. Specifically, if a trader is told that his signal quality is q and receives a high signal h then his belief is q/[q + (1 − q)] = q (respectively 1 − q if he receives a low signal l), because the prior is 1 / 2 . The belief π is thus held by people who receive signal h and quality q = π and by those who receive signal l and quality q = 1 − π. Consequently, the density of individuals with belief π is given by f 1 (π) = π[g(π) + g(1 − π)] when V = 1 and analogously by f 0 (π) = (1 − π)[g(π) + g(1 − π)] when V = 0. Smith and Sorensen (2008) prove the following property of private beliefs (Lemma 2 in their paper): Lemma 1 (Symmetric beliefs, Smith and Sorensen (2008) ) With the above signal quality structure, private belief distributions satisfy F 1 (π) = 1 − F 0 (1 − π) for all π ∈ (0, 1).
Belief densities obey the monotone likelihood ratio property as the following increases in
One can recover the distribution of qualities on [ / 2 ] it is given by f 1 (π) = Pr(l|V = 1, q = 1 − π)g(q = 1 − π) = 2π. Similarly, the density conditional on V = 0 is f 0 (π) = 2(1 − π). The distributions of private beliefs are then F 1 (π) = π 2 and F 0 (π) = 2π − π 2 . Figure 2 also illustrates that signals are informative:
recipients in favor of V = 0 are more likely to occur when V = 0 than when V = 1.
B Appendix: Simulation Procedure for Price Efficiency
We employed the following data generation procedure. We obtained 500,000 observations of trading days for each of the Poisson arrival rates ρ ∈ {10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50} and levels of informed trading µ ∈ {.1, .2, .3, .4, .5, .6, .7, .8, .9}. The Poisson arrival rate ρ implies that, on average, ρ traders arrive on any given day (some may choose not to trade). Fixing the fundamental to V = 1, higher prices are closer to the true fundamental and thus more efficient. To capture the effect of the entry rate ρ for transparent vs. opaque hybrid markets, we also ran these simulations for low entry rates ρ ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 15} for µ ∈ {.2, .5, .8}.
For each series, we first drew the number of traders for the session and performed the random allocation of traders into noise and informed and their entry order. Signals for informed traders and trading roles for noise traders were assigned as depicted in Figure 1 , conditional on the fundamental being V = 1. These traders then acted in sequence, and we determined the informed traders' optimal decisions and (for the hybrid market) the noise traders' choice of the trading venue, based on the preceding history, as described in Section II. We let the same sequence of traders act for each of the four trading rules (limit order market, dealer marker, hybrid market, and opaque hybrid market); note that the same informed trader may take different decisions in different markets. We then recorded the public expectation at the end of each sequence of traders for each of the four trading rules.
Our random number generation employs the Mersenne Twister algorithm (Matsumoto and Nishimura (1998) ). This algorithm greatly reduces the correlation of successive values that arises with most other pseudo-random number generators.
C Appendix: Omitted Proofs C.1 Some General Results and Notation
We will first introduce some notation and establish basic results that facilitate the analysis and proofs of our main results.
C.1.1 General notation for all proofs
In what follows, we will use function a t (Λ, π, π) to denote the time-t liquidity provider's expectation of the security value conditional on a buy order that stems from either a noise trader drawn from a mass of size Λ, or from an informed trader drawn from a mass of size µ and equipped with a private belief between π and π. Conditional on the true value being V = v, the probability of such an order is β v (Λ, π, π) = Λ + µ(F v (π) − F v (π)). Then, using Bayes Rule and rearranging,
This specification allows us to compactly express all equilibrium ask prices, with the exception of the price for small orders in the limit order segment of the hybrid market. For instance, the equilibrium ask price for the small size order in the pure limit order market can be written as ask
In the hybrid market, the mass of informed traders who trade large orders in the limit order segment is µξ 2 , the probability of a large buy order there is λ 2 + µξ
. Renormalizing, we can write the equilibrium ask price for this order as ask 2 HL = a t (λ 2 /ξ 2 , π 2 H , 1). All other prices are similar. Further, we will use function π * t (Λ, π) to denote π that solves
Function π * t (Λ, π) will be useful in compactly expressing the equilibrium thresholds, and we study its properties in more detail in the next subsection. In what follows, we will omit the subscript t whenever the usage is clear from the context.
C.1.2 Preliminary Properties
In what follows, it will often be mathematically convenient to express the private belief distributions F 1 , F 0 in terms of the underlying quality distribution function G: (10) and integrating by parts,
Lemma 2 (Properties of the equilibrium thresholds) (a) For every (Λ, π) such that 0 < Λ < 1 and 1 / 2 < π < 1, there exists a unique π ∈ (.5, π) that solves equation (9). This solution is independent of H t : π * t (Λ, π) = π * (Λ, π).
(b) π * (Λ, π) decreases in Λ and increases in π: ∂π * /∂Λ < 0 and ∂π * /∂π > 0.
(c) For fixed (Λ, π), π = π * (Λ, π) maximizes a t (Λ, π, π). Further, a t (Λ, π, π) increases in π for π < π * (Λ, π) and it decreases in π for π > π * (Λ, π).
Proof of (a): Equation (9) can be rewritten as
thus the solution does not depend on the history H t . Using (10) and (11), we rewrite (12) as
Denote the left hand side of the above equation by δ(Λ, π, π). Then
Steps (i) − (iii) imply existence and uniqueness of π * (Λ, π).
Proof of (b): Applying the Implicit Function Theorem and differentiating both sides of equation (13) with respect to Λ for a fixed π, we obtain
and G is increasing. Likewise, differentiating both sides of equation (13) with respect to π for a fixed Λ and using g to denote the density function of qualities, we obtain
Proof of (c): The first order condition for maximizing a t (Λ, π, π) in π can be written as
where the last equality follows from equation (7). Observe that this last equality coincides with equation (12). Consequently, there exists a unique π that maximizes a t (Λ, π, π) and this π = π * (Λ, π).
By (8), a t (Λ, π, π) increases in π when β 1 (Λ, π, π)/β 0 (Λ, π, π) increases in π. Using (7), (10), and (11), it can be shown that (∂/∂π)(β 1 (Λ, π, π)/β 0 (Λ, π, π)) > 0 when δ(Λ, π, π) > 0. The desired slopes then follow from part (a). By Lemma 2, we know that for every marginal trader of 2 units π 2 ∈ ( 1 / 2 , 1), there exists a unique marginal trader π 1 = π * (λ, π 2 ) who is indifferent between buying 1 unit and abstaining. Further, π 1 is increasing in π 2 . What remains to be shown is that there exists a marginal trader π 2 who is indifferent between purchasing 2 units and 1 unit, so that
C.2 Existence in the Limit
Denote the left hand side of (15) 
is the equilibrium threshold for the large quantity in the limit order market. Then
where step (i) follows from Lemma 2 and the fact that Eπ strictly increases in π for p ∈ (0, 1). Steps (i) − (iii) imply existence and uniqueness of π 2 ∈ (π 
C.4 Hybrid Market: Proof of Theorem 1 (c) and Proposition 1
As discussed in the main text, we omit the description of equilibria with market specialization and focus on the equilibrium where orders of all sizes are traded in both segments. In this equilibrium, the execution costs for each order size must coincide across the two segments so that all traders are indifferent between trading in the two segments of the hybrid market (else, they would gravitate towards the cheaper segment). As discussed in the main text, we construct this equilibrium by adjusting the distribution of noise trading in such a manner that (a) marginal buyers π 1 H and π 2 H satisfy their optimality conditions (indifference between trading and not and indifference between trading one and two units respectively), and (b) execution costs in the two segments coincide.
The proof will proceed in 4 steps. We first assume that the marginal buyer π Notation: Before we proceed to Step 1, we will remind the reader of the main pieces of notation used in the main text and introduce additional notation that will be used to facilitate the exposition of the proof.
As in the main text, π The probability that an informed trader, who submits a buy order of size o, sends it to the limit order segment is denoted by ξ o , hence, the total mass of informed traders who submit orders of size 2 to the limit order segment when the security liquidation value is v is given by µξ
H )) and that of informed traders who submit orders of size 1 there is µξ
denote the expectation of a liquidity provider, conditional on an order that stems from either a noise trader who wants to buy 1 or 2 units (drawn from masses of size Λ 1 and Λ 2 , respectively), or from an informed trader who wants to buy 1 or 2 units (with a private belief between π and π, drawn from a mass of size µξ 1 , and with a private belief between π and 1, drawn from a mass of size µξ 2 , respectively):
The equilibrium price for the first unit in the limit order book can then be expressed as
Likewise, similarly to π * t (Λ, π), we use Π * t (Λ 1 , Λ 2 ; ξ 1 , ξ 2 ; π) to denote π that solves
Step 1:
L , 1] we find λ 2 (π 2 ) such that π 2 satisfies the equilibrium condition for the marginal buyer of a larger order in the limit order segment,
We show that a unique such
Proof: By Lemma 2, for every Λ 2 ∈ [0, λξ 2 ], there exists a unique π
L . With such a 1:1 mapping, we then know that for every
, and that it strictly decreases
Step 2:
, 1] and given λ 2 (π 2 ) we construct λ 1 (π 2 ) and π 1 (π 2 ) so that they satisfy, first, the equilibrium conditions for the marginal buyer of small size orders in each segment and, second, the cost equalization condition for small orders when the marginal buyer of a large order is assumed to be π 2 :
We show that unique such
The proof of Step 2 uses the following modification of Lemma 2:
there exists a unique π ∈ (.5, π) that solves equation (16) 
and it decreases in π for π > Π * (Λ 1 , λ 2 (π); ξ 1 , ξ 2 ; π).
25 Recall that the definition of a(Λ, π, π) assumes that noise traders are drawn from mass Λ and informed traders are drawn from mass µ. The hybrid market segment attracts fraction ξ 2 of informed traders of large orders. Expressing the ask prices in terms of function a thus yields a renormalizing factor 1/ξ 2 in front of the mass of noise traders. The same applies to π * (Λ, π). Further, function λ 2 (π 2 ) also depends on the parameter ξ 2 . To ease the exposition, we will omit the explicit dependence on parameters ξ 1 , ξ 2 from functions λ 1 , λ 2 and π 1 that we construct in Steps 1-3.
The proof of Lemma 4 follows the same steps as that of Lemma 2, additionally accounting for the definition of λ 2 (π) from
Step 1, and is omitted.
Proof of
Step 2: Existence of π 1 (π 2 ), and bounds on λ 1 (π 2 ) and π 1 (π 2 ). By Lemmas 2 and 4, for every
and Π * (Λ 1 , λ 2 (π 2 ); ξ 1 , ξ 2 ; π 2 ) that satisfy the equilibrium conditions for the marginal buyers of small orders in dealer and limit order market segments respectively. What remains to be shown is that for every π 2 ∈ [π 2 L , 1] there exists a unique Λ 1 such that these marginal buyers (and, consequently, the costs for small orders) coincide:
Denoting the left-hand side of (19) by δ H (Λ 1 ; ξ 1 , ξ 2 ; π 2 ),
Parts (i) follows by Lemmas 2 and 4; part (iii) by Lemmas 2 and 4 and the definition of
2 ) and the definition of λ 2 (π 2 ), after some algebraic simplification we can rewrite the latter inequality as π * (λ, π 2 ) < π 2 , which holds by Lemma 2.
Together (i) − (iii) imply that there exists a unique Λ 1 ∈ (λξ 1 , λ) that solves (19).
Lemma 2 then implies that π
. We will henceforth denote this Λ 1 by λ 1 (π 2 ) and the corresponding threshold by π 1 (π 2 ).
Step 2: We show that
Together (i) and (ii) imply the desired property of
similarly to equation (13) and rearranging, π = π 1 (π 2 ) must satisfy
Denoting the left-hand side of the above equation byδ(λ, π, π 2 ), first, ∂δ/∂π < 0, second,
Consequently, for all π 2 , there exists a unique π ∈ (π * (λ, π 2 ), π 2 ) that solves this equation; further, this π does not depend on ξ 1 . This unique π then must equal π 1 (π 2 ), and the latter is thus independent of ξ 1 .
To show part (ii), we proceed by contradiction. Set ξ 1 = ξ 2 . This implies, in particular,
. Suppose now that there exist
. Then we must have λ 1 (π 2 ) > λ 1 (π 2 ) in order for the marginal buyer of a small order in the limit order segment to satisfy π
But, by the same Lemma, λ 1 (π 2 ) > λ 1 (π 2 ), together withπ 2 > π 2 , implies the reverse inequality for this marginal buyer in the dealer market segment, π
Step 3: We show that there exists a unique
that satisfies the equilibrium condition for the marginal buyer of a large size order in the dealer market segment, given functions π 1 (π 2 ), λ 1 (π 2 ) and λ 2 (π 2 ) defined above:
Proof: Denote the left hand side of equation (20) 
where the last equality is due to the equilibrium condition in the pure limit order market, and the inequality is due to
where the first inequality follows since λ 2 (π 2 D ) < λξ 2 and function a(Λ, π, π) is decreasing in Λ. The second inequality is a consequence of Step 2, as π
To complete the proof of Step 3, we will now show that for
Step 2, it suffices to show that
which is equivalent to 
, and, third, function a(Λ, π 2 , 1) is decreasing in Λ.
Step 4: We show that π 2 H cannot be smaller than π 2 L .
Proof:
implies that λ 2 > λξ 2 , and consequently Eπ where, as defined in Section C.1.1, 
where δ(Λ, π, π) is as defined in the proof of Lemma 2 and, in particular, δ(Λ, π, 1) =
G is the distribution function of qualities. In the remainder, we will need the following derivative
Step 1: We show that for every
The uniqueness of π 1 (π 2 ) implies that π
Proof: Denote the left hand side of (23) by ψ(π 1 , π 2 ). Then (i) by (24), ∂ψ/∂π 1 < 0;
(ii) at
Together (i) − (iii) imply existence and uniqueness of the desired
Step 2: Part (a): Market Width for Small Trades. We show that the execution costs are ordered as follows
Proof: By the proof of Theorem (existence), π
Since in equilibrium, C(1) = ask 1 = Eπ 1 in all 3 markets, it suffices to show that π 1 (π 2 ) defined in Step 1 strictly decreases in π 2 . Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to (23) and using (24),
Step 3: Part (a): Execution Costs for Large Trades. We show that the execution costs are ordered as follows C L (2) < C H (2) < C D (2).
Proof: The equilibrium conditions for marginal buyers imply that the cost for a large order coincides with the sum of the marginal buyers expectations, C(2) = Eπ 1 + Eπ 2 . It thus suffices to show that the latter sum increases in π 2 ,
Using (24) and (25), the above inequality is true if and only if
Rearranging, the latter is equivalent to (
Step 4 Proof: Price impacts in the limit order market reflect the change in the public expectation after the order size is revealed. The relation ∆p 
Step 5: Part (b): Price Impacts of Large Trades. To describe the price impacts of large trades, we show that ask
Proof: The first inequality follows from Step 3, since 2ask
The remaining inequalities follow by Lemma 2, since λ 2 < λξ 2 :
C.7 Behavioral Dynamics: Proof of Proposition 4
We show only the proof for the buy-thresholds; the sell-thresholds are analogous. Lemma 2 implies the result for the limit order market.
where the second equality follows from (23), and the inequality follows as δ(λ, π 27 In the proof of Proposition 3, we used π 1 (π 2 ) to denote π 1 that solved (23) and studied the behavior of π 1 in π 2 as we changed markets. Here π 1 (π 2 ) denotes the equilibrium threshold within a market. Table I : Differences of Averages and Standard Deviations for Price Distributions. This table is based on the simulations of the closing prices. Rows denote the level of informed trading µ, columns denote the entry rate ρ. The top half of the table reports the sign of the difference of the average closing prices for a specific (ρ, µ)-combination between two markets that are named at the top of the table. The bottom half of the table reports the sign of the difference of the standard deviations of closing prices. As the underlying true value is V = 1, the higher a price is, the closer it is to the true value and the more efficient it is. Thus a positive difference of the average closing prices indicates that prices in the first named market are more efficient. A positive difference of the standard deviations of closing prices indicates that prices in the first named market are more dispersed. This difference is a function of the probability of informed trading µ and the prior p. We display it here as a projection such that µ is on the horizontal axis. If for a given µ the graph is entirely above the horizontal axis, then for that µ, price movements in the first named market are stronger in the direction of the fundamental and this market is thus more efficient. 
